Insurance, Public Policy, and Employment Discrimination by Willborn, Steven L.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1982
Insurance, Public Policy, and Employment
Discrimination
Steven L. Willborn
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Willborn, Steven L., "Insurance, Public Policy, and Employment Discrimination" (1982). Minnesota Law Review. 2372.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2372
Insurance, Public Policy, And Employment
Discrimination
Steven L. Willborn*
I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance for liability resulting from illegal employment
discrimination' is a relatively recent phenomenon.2 It is not,
however, a surprising phenomenon. Employer liability for ille-
gal employment discrimination has been significant,3 and em-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
1. A number of federal statutes prohibit certain types of employment dis-
crimination. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976) (prohib-
its certain discrimination in wage rates on the basis of sex); Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976) (prohibits
certain employment discrimination on the basis of age); Vocational Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-774 (1976) (prohibits certain hand-
icap discrimination); Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (prohibits
certain racial discrimination); Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)
(prohibits certain discrimination under color of state law); Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Ti-
tle VII] (prohibits certain employment discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin). Most states, see 3 EMPL. PPAc. GUIDE
(CCH) 20,005-29,335, and many local governments, see, e.g., LINcoLN, NEB.,
MUN. CODE ch. 11, § 11.02-.08 (1980); MADISON, Wis., GEN. ORD. § 3.23 (1981),
have similar prohibitions. This Article focuses on Title VII, the most far-reach-
ing and comprehensive federal prohibition. C. ABERNATHY, CIvIL RIGHTS CASES
AND MATERIALS 442 (1980).
2. Employer claims of insurance coverage for liability resulting from em-
ployment discrimination have created two basic issues: (1) whether the lan-
guage in current liability policies covers such losses, see Appalachian Ins. Co. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp., 507 F. Supp. 59 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (no coverage); Trans-
port Ins. Co. v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1325 (N.D. Tex. 1980)
(coverage); and (2) if there is such coverage under the policy, whether public
policy prohibits recovery, see Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178
(7th Cir. 1980); Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 452 F. Supp. 565
(S.D. Ga. 1978). Both of these issues, as the cases cited indicate, are of recent
vintage. This Article focuses on public policy issues and not on issues of con-
tract construction. The contract construction issues are relatively unimportant.
In the absence of a public policy bar, contracts can be changed to provide or to
preclude coverage for employment discrimination liability. Cf. Pratter & Baker,
The Status of Personal Liability and Comprehensive General Liability Insur-
ance Coverage of Civil Rights Damages, 48 INS. CouNs. J. 259, 266 (1981) (extent
of municipalities' insurance coverage of civil rights damage awards may be
negotiated).
3. During 1980, 29,000 persons received $43,000,000 in back pay and other
benefits through EEOC efforts. See 106 LAB. REL REP. (BNA) 70, 71 (1981).
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ployers have predictably attempted to divert or at least to
minimize its burdens. 4 Insurance is merely one employer strat-
egy for accomplishing that end.5 Because employers are in part
held liable to deter future violations of the employment dis-
crimination laws, 6 the extent to which employers can minimize
their liability through insurance can Undermine the deterrence
goal of Title VII remedies.
This Article discusses the conflict between insurance and
deterrence.7 The conflict is interesting not only because it
presents an insurance law issue-whether employers may in-
sure against losses resulting from illegal employment discrimi-
nation, but also because it focuses on a classic but poorly
understood employment discrimination issue-the nature of
From July 1, 1979 to September 30, 1980, victims of Equal Pay Act violations ob-
tained about $3,226,000 in benefits. See 107 LAB. REL REP. (BNA) 410 (1981).
4. By obtaining insurance, employers can minimize the burden of poten-
tial employment discrimination liability by "substituting a fixed premium for
larger potential losses." Comment, Insurance Against Civil Liability for Em-
ployment Discrimination, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 192, 192 (1980). The larger losses
are then diverted to the insurer and indirectly to the pool of employers
purchasing insurance. See infra note 97.
5. Employers have had mixed success in avoiding the burdens of employ-
ment discrimination liability. In United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979), for example, the employer was "able to avoid all economic cost [for its
past discriminatory activity] by diverting the loss to innocent white workers."
Neuborne, Observations on Weber, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 546, 550 n.12 (1979). See
also id. at 558. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S.
77 (1981), however, the employer unsuccessfully attempted to force a labor
union to absorb a portion of the loss. Id. at 94-95.
6. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975). See also
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 324 (1977) (Con-
gress vested courts with broad equitable powers in Title VII cases in part to
prevent future discriminatory practices).
7. The conflict between insurance and deterrence has been a persistent
plague on the insurance industry. In 1746, limits were placed on the issuance of
marine insurance policies because such policies had not only undermined de-
terrence, but had also encouraged "pernicious practices, whereby great num-
bers of ships, with their cargoes, have either been fraudulently lost and
destroyed, or taken by the enemy in time of war." Statute of George II, 1746, 19
Geo. 2, ch. 37. In France "life insurance was in early times prohibited, because
it might operate as an incentive to those who would benefit by the termination
of a life to hasten such termination." State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Merchant's
Exch. Mut. Benevolent Soc'y, 72 Mo. 146, 158 (1880). See also Statute of George
I1, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, ch. 48. Fire insurance was also attacked as undermining de-
terrence, because 'it was a temptation to commit arson or, at the least, to spec-
ulate." Comment, Illegality as a Factor in Liability Insurance, 41 COLum. L.
REV. 26, 26 (1941). Modern insurance innovations have not escaped criticism on
this basis. See, e.g., Pfennigstorf, Environmen Damages, and Compensation,
1979 AM. B. FoumN. RESEARCH J. 349 (insurance for damages caused by pollu-
tion); Note, Limiting the Role of Insurance in Civil Rights Litigation: A Case
-for Re-establishing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as an Enforcement Mechanism, 5 J. CoRP. L.
305, 337 (1980) (insurance for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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the discriminatory intent element in employment discrimina-
tion cases. The Article first describes the current, albeit incho-
ate, doctrine on the issue of whether employers may insure
against illegal employment discrimination. The Article then
critically examines the inchoate doctrine by evaluating its un-
derlying assumptions. Finally, the Article rejects the inchoate
doctrine and adopts a new approach that expands an em-
ployer's ability to insure against employment discrimination li-
ability, while addressing more directly the potential conflict
between insurance and deterrence.
II. THE INCHOATE DOCTRINE
The inchoate doctrines treats the conflict between insur-
ance and deterrence broadly by distinguishing between two
general theories of discrimination--disparate treatment and
disparate impact.9 Although the inchoate doctrine prohibits in-
surance for liability resulting from disparate treatment discrim-
ination,' 0 it permits insurance for liability resulting from
8. This Article uses the term "inchoate doctrine" to refer to the emerging
doctrine on the issue of insurance for employment discrimination liability.
9. For general discussions of the disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact theories, see C. SULIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY
LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 1.3-1.6 (1980) [hereinafter cited as FED-
ERAL STATUTORY LAW]; Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case
in Employment Discrimination Litigation A Critique, 65 CORNE. L. REV. 1, 3-
15 (1979).
10. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 23 FEP
Cases 778, 782 n.12 (D.D.C. 1980) (dicta). See Comment, supra note 4, at 199,
202-03. Two state insurance departments have also prohibited insurance for
disparate treatment discrimination. In the Matter of Liability Insurance Pro-
posed to Cover Liability for Acts of Discrimination Because of Race, Creed,
Color or National Origin, Opinion of the New York Superintendent of Insur-
ance (Sept. 26, 1963), reprinted in ONE HUNDRED AND FIF=H PRELIMINARY RE-
PORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE TO THE NEW YORK LEGISLATURE
COVERING THE CALENDAR YEAR 1963 (1964) [hereinafter cited as New York
Opinion]; 1945 Op. Ohio Att'y Gen. 295. Both opinions were written before the
origin of disparate impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971). Consequently, neither distinguishes between the two theories of dis-
crimination. Both opinions discuss only insurance for discrimination liability
that is based on proof of discriminatory intent. See New York Opinion, supra,
at 7 ("[A] basic premise of any [discrimination] cause of action . . .is the
existence on the defendant's part of some generally discriminatory attitude to-
ward (or prejudice against) those of a particular race, creed, color or national
origin."); 1945 Op. Ohio Att'y Gen. 295, 298 ("[A] violation of [Ohio's anti-dis-
crimination statute] would not only be a crime but would necessarily amount
to an intentional wrong committed against the aggrieved party."). Thus, they
discuss only the issue of insurance for liability resulting from disparate treat-
ment discrimination, and both opinions prohibit such insurance. The opinions
are silent, however, on the issue of insurance for liability resulting from dispa-
rate impact discrimination.
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disparate impact discrimination." Proof differences between
the two theories provide the rationale for the distinction.
In disparate treatment cases the crucial element is the em-
ployer's discriminatory intent.12 Since direct evidence of dis-
criminatory intent is rarely available, 13 the development of the
law in this area has focused on the methods of proving or of re-
butting inferences of discriminatory intent. In McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,14 for example, the Supreme Court held
that an individual plaintiff could create an inference of discrim-
inatory intent by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. 15
The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the inference
by "articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection."' 6 If the employer meets this bur-
den, the plaintiff must show that the employer's "stated reason
for... rejection was in fact pretext."'l In attempting to prove
11. Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1187-88 (7th Cir. 1980).
See also Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 567-68
(S.D. Ga. 1978) (insurance to protect against liability from Title VII that does
not cover intentional acts of discrimination is not against public policy). See
Comment, supra note 4, at 199-203 (insurance is permissible if liability results
from disparate impact discrimination and employer could not have prevented
violation by exercising due care).
12. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)
("[The plaintiff's] ultimate burden [is to persuade] the trier of fact that the de-
fendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff."); Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978) ("Title VII prohibits [an employer]
from having as a goal a work force selected by any proscribed discriminatory
practice."); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324. 335-36
n.15 (1977) ("Proof of discriminatory motive is critical."). See FEDERAL STATU-
TORY LAW, supra note 9, at § 1.4; Friedman, supra note 9, at 10-11, 14; Mendez,
-Presumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases,
32 STAN. L. REv. 1129, 1129-30 & n.3 (1980); Note, Section 1981: Discriminatory
Purpose or Disproportionate Impact?, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 137, 144 (1980).
13. For a rare case in which direct evidence was available, see Butta v.
Anne Arundel County, 473 F. Supp. 83, 87 (D. Md. 1979) (employer told white
applicant that he would prefer to fill position with a black).
14. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
15. Id. at 802. See also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 358 n.44
(1977).
16. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802. See also Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1981); Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 & n.2 (1979) (per
curiam).
17. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 804. See also Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
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pretext, the plaintiff is once again attempting to create an infer-
ence of discriminatory intent.18 Inferences of discriminatory
intent in disparate treatment cases can also be proven19 or re-
butted2o by the use of statistics.21
By contrast, disparate impact discrimination focuses on the
consequences of the employer's actions, not on the employer's
intent.22 The plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by proving
that a facially neutral job requirement has an adverse impact
on a protected group.23 A plaintiff, for example, could establish
18. Mosby v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 1977) ('The plain-
tiff must then be given a fair opportunity to show that the reasons tendered by
the employer are merely a pretext, thus demonstrating that the employer's con-
duct was in reality racially motivated."). See Friedman, supra note 9, at 11("proof of pretext translates into proof of discriminatory intent").
19. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40
(1977).
20. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978).
21. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977),
Justice Stewart stated:
[A] bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscrimi-
natory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less
representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in
the community from which employees are hired. Evidence of longlast-
ing and gross disparity between the composition of a work force and
that of the general population thus may be [a telltale sign of pur-
poseful discrimination].
Id. at 340 n.20 (bracketed language is from an earlier portion of the same para-
graph). See D. BArDus & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRMmNATION (1980).
22. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1977) ('The gist of
[a disparate impact claim] does not involve an assertion of purposeful discrimi-
natory motive.... [R]ather, [the gist is] that... facially neutral qualification
standards work in fact disproportionately to exclude women from eligibility for
employment."); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
336 n.15 (1977) ("Proof of discriminatory motive.., is not required under a dis-
parate-impact theory."); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)
('"Title VII forbids the use of employment tests that are discriminatory in effect
unless the employer meets [its burden of justification]."); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) ('The Act proscribes not only overt dis-
crimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion .... Congress directed the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation."). See generally FEDERAL
STATUTORY LAw, supra note 9, § 1.5(a); Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hypothe-
sis Testing and Its Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HASTINGS IUJ. 59, 60 n.4
(1980); Friedman, supra note 9, at 11-13; Lerner, Employment Discrimination:
Adverse Impac Validity, and Equality, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 17, 22-23; Maltz, The
Expansion of the Role of the Effects Test in Anti-discrimination Law: A Critical
Analysis, 59 NEB. L. REv. 345, 346-47 (1980); Note, supra note 12, at 144-45.
23. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), for example, the plain-
tiffs established a prima facie case by presenting evidence that a high school
education requirement excluded 88 percent of black males, but only 66 percent
of white males. Id. at 430 n.6. See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977), where height and weight standards operated to exclude more than 41
percent of the female population, but less than 1 percent of the male popula-
tion. Id. at 329-30 & n.12.
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a prima facie case by demonstrating that an employer's facially
neutral requirement that all shipping employees weigh at least
180 pounds disqualifies a substantially greater proportion of
women than men. "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory
intent does not redeem" a requirement that has such a dispa-
rate impact.24 Rather, the burden shifts to the employer to
prove that the requirement is job related in that it bears a
"manifest relationship to the employment in question."25 The
employer in the example may meet this burden by showing
that all shipping employees have to lift materials weighing 100
pounds as part of their job and that generally only people
weighing 180 pounds can do so. If the employer meets this bur-
den, the plaintiff can still prevail by demonstrating that another
requirement "without a similarly undesirable [sex-biased] ef-
fect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'effi-
cient and trustworthy workmanship.' "26 The hypothetical
plaintiff then may prove that a series of lifting tests would as-
sure the employer that all shipping employees could lift 100
pounds but would have a less onerous impact on women.27
The inchoate doctrine focuses on these proof differences.
Since the crucial element in disparate treatment discrimination
24. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
25. Id. See also New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 &
n.31 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
26. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)). See also Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
27. This last burden may result in a more exact correlation between job
duties and job requirements, but it probably has only a minimal impact on Title
VII's goal of eliminating sex discrimination. Using the hypothetical in the text,
the employer's job requirement that shipping employees must weigh at least
180 pounds does not correlate with the job duties of a shipping employee.
Some persons weighing at least 180 pounds may not be able to lift 100 pounds
while some under that weight may be able to lift 100 pounds. In addition, the
employer's job requirement discriminates against women-the rule disqualifies
a larger proportion of women than men. The plaintiffs proposed tests would
assure the employer that every shipping employee can lift 100 pounds and
would thus meet the correlation problem. The tests, however, may not meet,
and indeed may aggravate, the sex discrimination problem. Assume, for exam-
ple, that the percentage of women that can lift 100 pounds is the same as the
percentage of women who weigh 180 pounds or over; assume further that the
same is true for men. Under these assumptions, the plaintiff's tests will have
an adverse impact on women equal to that of the employer's job requirement.
The plaintiff's tests may have a slightly greater or lesser adverse impact on wo-
men than the employer's, but it is unlikely that the plaintiff's approach, at least
in this hypothetical, would ever significantly lessen the adverse impact on wo-
men. Although this is a significant issue, it is beyond the scope of this Article.
While this criticism does not completely undermine the desirability of this as-
pect of a disparate impact case, it does suggest that refinement is necessary.
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is discriminatory intent, those liable are intentional wrongdoers
who presumably may be deterred by the prospect of damages
imposed by law.2 8 Insurance, which protects these wrongdoers
from damages, would undermine the deterrent effect of dam-
ages.2 9 Hence, to preserve the deterrent effect, the doctrine
prohibits insurance for such liability.3 0 The doctrine, however,
permits insurance for liability resulting from disparate impact
discrimination. 31 Since liability for such discrimination is
based on the consequences of an employer's actions and not on
discriminatory intent, those liable are unintentional wrongdo-
ers. Unintentional wrongdoers by definition cannot be deterred
by the prospect of damages. 32 Because damages have no deter-
rent effect on disparate impact discrimination, there is no in-
surance-deterrence conflict and, therefore, no valid reason to
prohibit insurance.33
II. ANALYSIS OF THE INCHOATE DOCTRINE
The inchoate doctrine rests on a number of assumptions
about insurance, employment discrimination, and public policy.
The doctrine only precludes insurance for intent-based discrim-
ination and uses the disparate treatment/disparate impact dis-
tinction as its barometer of intent. The inchoate doctrine
assumes that the disparate treatment/disparate impact distinc-
tion is an accurate and useful indicator of dscriminatory intent
and that discriminatory intent in employment discrimination
law34 invariably justifies a public policy restriction on insur-
ance coverage. In addition, to the extent the inchoate doctrine
28. Indeed, deterrence is one of the primary goals of liability in Title VII
cases. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
29. Note, supra note 7, at 337-41; Comment, supra note 4, at 195, 199. See
also Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 441-42 (5th Cir.
1962); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218,
227-28, 397 N.E.2d 737, 743-44, 422 N.Y.S.2d 47, 53-54, (1979); Note, Torts-Insur-
ance Coverage and Scope of Liability for Punitive Damages, 58 OR. L. REV. 263,
268-73 (1979). See generally R. KEETON, BASIc TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw § 5.3(f)
(1971); E. PATrERSON, ESSENTLALS OF INSURANCE LAw § 58, at 264 (2d ed. 1957).
30. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
32. Comment, supra note 4, at 199. See also R. KEETON, supra note 29,
§ 3.3(a).
33. Indeed, public policy reasons exist for encouraging such insurance.
Public interests in freedom of contract, see Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619
F.2d 1178, 1187-88 (7th Cir. 1980); Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Casualty
Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978), and in equitable compensation
schemes, see infra notes 85-100 and accompanying text, support a public policy
permitting such insurance.
34. See infra notes 58-84 and accompanying text.
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precludes insurance coverage, it assumes that the benefits of
deterrence outweigh the benefits of insurance compensation.
Finally, the inchoate doctrine assumes that public policy must
be used to control abuses that would result from a less re-
strained operation of the insurance market.
A. THE DISPARATE TREATMENT/DIPsARATE IMPACT DITICToN
The basis of the inchoate doctrine, the disparate treat-
ment/disparate impact distinction,35 is neither an accurate nor
useful indicator of discriminatory intent. It is not accurate be-
cause disparate impact cases may be intent-based; it is not use-
ful because it is often impossible to determine whether liability
is based upon disparate treatment or disparate impact
discrimination.
Despite the conventional wisdom to the contrary, disparate
impact cases may be intent-based. Although Title VII plaintiffs
do not have to prove discriminatory intent to establish a prima
facie case of disparate impact discrimination,36 it does not fol-
low that discriminatory intent is always absent. Rather, it is
equally, if not more,37 plausible that discriminatory intent is
present but unproven.38 Moreover, in some disparate impact
cases discriminatory intent may be clearly present. If the em-
ployer proves that the neutral criterion is job-related, the plain-
35. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
36. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
37. To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that a facially neutral employment criterion has an
adverse impact on a protected group. See supra note 23 and accompanying
text. Evidence of such an adverse impact may be evidence of discriminatory
intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) ("Necessarily, an in-
vidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the
relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on
one race than another."). Thus, in every successful disparate impact case,
there is some evidence of discriminatory intent.
38. One rationale for a finding of disparate impact discrimination empha-
sizes the employer's motive in choosing a facially neutral criterion with a dispa-
rate impact:
The theory is that if the employer chose the seemingly innocent crite-
rion not to further his business interests but merely to satisfy his taste
for discrimination (or that of his customers or workers), then the em-
ployment decision adversely affecting Negroes is not based on the in-
nocent criterion but instead on race. Race is the 'real" basis of the job
allocation.
Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHL L. REv. 235, 297 (1971).
Professor Fiss rejects this psychological rationale in favor of a "functional
equivalence" rationale, which examines the allegedly racist criterion in terms
of how closely it equals a requirement clearly based on race. Id. at 297-99. This
latter rationale also recognizes that discriminatory intent may be present and
relevant in a disparate impact case. Id. at 299-300.
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tiff may prevail by demonstrating that another criterion would
also serve the employer's legitimate interest but would have a
less adverse impact on the protected class.39 The Supreme
Court has stated that such a showing "would be evidence that
the employer was using its [facially neutral job requirement]
merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination."40 Since "pretext" in
employment discrimination law connotes a cover-up for illegal
discriminatory intent,41 such disparate impact cases are bla-
tantly intent-based. 4 2 Similarly, a plaintiff may establish a
prima facie disparate impact claim by proving that a written ex-
amination forming part of the hiring process has a disparate
impact on blacks. The employer may present a "bottom line"
defense 43 demonstrating that, despite the effects of the written
examination, the total hiring process does not have a disparate
impact on blacks. This bottom line defense will be successful 44
unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the employer intention-
ally used the written examination to distort the hiring pro-
cess. 45 Thus,, discriminatory intent is again conspicuously
present in a disparate impact case. To the extent that the in-
choate doctrine permits insurance for disparate impact discrim-
ination because of the presumed absence of discriminatory
intent, the doctrine is imprecise.
The disparate treatment/disparate impact distinction used
as an indicator of the propriety of insurance, however, is not
only imprecise; it also lacks usefulness. The distinction is not
useful because it is often impossible to determine whether the
basis of liability is disparate treatment or disparate impact.
39. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
40. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973)).
41. See FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW, supra note 9, § 1.5(e), at 58, § 1.6(a), at
64.
42. See Friedman, supra note 9, at 14-15.
43. See generally B. ScHLEi & P. GRossmAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMNATION
LAW 1191-93 (1976); Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29
C.F.R. § 1607 (1980).
44. See, e.g., Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61, 66 (4th Cir. 1978); Rule v. Iron-
workers Local 396, 568 F.2d 558, 565 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Troyan, 520
F.2d 492, 497-98 (6th Cir. 1975); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correc-
tional Serv., 520 F.2d 420, 425 (2nd Cir. 1975); Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv.
Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1261-63 (D. Conn. 1979); Lee v. City of Richmond, 456 F.
Supp. 756, 771 (E.D. Va. 1978). But see Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
491 F.2d 1364, 1372-73 (5th Cir. 1974); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 894-95 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
45. Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1263 (D. Conn.
1979) ("[The] intentional use of components having a disproportionate effect
on minority groups [may] establish a primafacie case of violation of Title VII,
even if the total hiring process results in balanced results.").
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The obvious example is a case that is settled out of court. Al-
though the complaints in many suits allege both disparate
treatment and disparate impact discrimination, settlements
usually do not specify the basis of liability,46 and may specifi-
cally deny that any illegal discrimination occurred.47 In either
case, the disparate treatment/disparate impact distinction is
not useful. Rather, since the inchoate doctrine prohibits insur-
ance coverage for disparate treatment discrimination but per-
mits it for disparate impact discrimination, an employer's claim
for insurance coverage would necessitate litigation of the un-
derlying discrimination claim to determine whether such cover-
age is appropriate. 48
It is often impossible to determine whether the basis of lia-
bility is disparate treatment or disparate impact discrimination
even if the parties have fully litigated the case. In Legg Mason
Wood Walker, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America,49 for ex-
ample, the plaintiff presented a prima facie case of disparate
treatment discrimination.5 0 The burden then shifted to the em-
ployer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its refusal to hire the plaintiff.5 ' To meet its burden, the em-
ployer cited two facially neutral reasons for refusing to hire the
plaintiff: a lack of sales experience and inadequate results on a
written test which purportedly measured sales motivation.52
The plaintiff then successfully argued that the proffered rea-
sons were not legitimate and nondiscriminatory, because they
46. See, e.g., Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 452 F. Supp.
565, 566 (S.D. Ga. 1978).
47. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 210 (1979) (Black-
mun, J., concurring).
48. If litigation is necessary to determine the propriety of insurance cover-
age, the employer's motivation to settle .to avoid expensive litigation is under-
cut. By requiring litigation of the underlying claim to determine the propriety
of insurance, the inchoate doctrine may thus undermine Title VII's preference
for resolving employment discrimination suits through conciliation and volun-
tary settlement. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826,
837 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968).
49. 23 FEP Cases 778 (D.D.C. 1980). The court in Legg Mason considered
the issue of insurance coverage for an employer found guilty of employment
discrimination in an earlier action. The earlier case, Kinsey v. First Regional
Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d 830 (D.C. Cir. 1977), considered the discrimination issue and
the Legg Mason court relied upon it.
50. Kinsey v. First Regional Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 836, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
51. Kinsey v. First Regional Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 836-38 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
52. Kinsey v. First Regional Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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had a disparate impact.5 3 Thus, the plaintiff successfully used
disparate impact theory to attack the employer's reasons for
the adverse employment decision and thereby revived his dis-
parate treatment claim. When the employer claimed insurance
coverage, then, the issue was whether the discrimination was
intentional or unintentional54 or, stated differently, whether the
basis of liability was disparate treatment or disparate impact
discrimination. The court held that the basis of liability was
disparate impact and, hence, that insurance coverage was ap-
propriate.55 Because the theories of discrimination were inter-
twined,56 the court with equal justification could have ruled
that the basis of liability was disparate treatment
discrimination.5 7
53. 23 FEP Cases at 783 ("[The Court of Appeals] concluded only that
Legg Mason's employment practices had a discriminatory impact and that the
asserted reasons for not hiring Mr. Kinsey were not sufficiently justified by
business necessity.").
54. In Legg Mason, the insurance contract excluded coverage for inten-
tional discrimination. 23 FEP Cases at 782. Thus, the intention issue was dis-
cussed to determine the contractual issue of whether coverage was provided.
The Court recognized, however, that if the contract had not excluded inten-
tional discrimination, the inchoate doctrine would have done so. Id. at 782 n.12.
Consequently, resolution of the intention issue would have been necessary to
determine whether the inchoate doctrine rather than the contract precluded
coverage.
55. 23 FEP Cases at 783 n.13 ("An analysis of the Court of Appeals' opinion
reveals that the Court of Appeals did not find intentional discrimination."). Al-
though discussing the plaintiff's disparate treatment claim, the court evidently
concluded that a disparate impact claim had been proven and that "[nlothing
more was required to impose liability on Legg Mason, and nothing more was
found." Id. at 783.
56. The Legg Mason opinion illustrates another reason the disparate treat-
ment/disparate impact distinction has limited utility: the courts do not under-
stand it. The court began its discussion by reciting the elements of a disparate
treatment case. 23 FEP Cases at 783. The court then displayed its misunder-
standing by stating that intent to discriminate was not an element of such a
case, citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the seminal disparate
impact case. Intent to discriminate is the crucial element of a disparate treat-
ment case but is not an essential element of a disparate impact case. See supra
notes 15-22 and accompanying text. The court further demonstrated its misun-
derstanding by arguing that "a finding of pretext does not necessarily mean
that the discrimination was intentional." 23 FEP Cases at 783. The court never
explains its novel understanding of pretext; it would have been difficult to do so
since "proof of pretext translates into proof of discriminatory intent." Fried-
man, supra note 9, at 11 (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying
text.
57. Indeed, the argument that the basis of liability was disparate treatment
discrimination is stronger. The plaintiff presented a basic disparate treatment
claim. Disparate impact was only used to rebut the reasons proffered by the
employer for the adverse employment decision. When those reasons were re-
butted, the plaintiff's basic disparate treatment claim was revived, and that
claim was the basis of liability. See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
1982] INSURANCE 1013
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
B. DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
The disparate treatment/disparate impact distinction is
therefore neither an accurate nor useful indicator of discrimi-
natory intent. If a precise indicator could be found, however,
the inchoate doctrine would prohibit insurance coverage for
losses resulting from cases in which discriminatory intent was
present.5 8 Discriminatory intent in employment discrimination
is not invariably the type of intent that justifies a public policy
limitation on insurance coverage.
Intentional misconduct by the insured does not always jus-
tify a prohibition on insurance coverage. To the contrary, the
payment of insurance is permitted for many intention-based
actions. A driver who intentionally exceeds the speed limit and
becomes involved in an accident will not be denied insurance
coverage. 59 Nor will insurance coverage necessarily be denied
for a person who commits a battery.60 Thus, a special type of
intentional misconduct is necessary to justify a public policy
prohibition on insurance.6 1 One commentator identified this
type of intentional misconduct as "designing" intent-the in-
sured must have committed the act creating the insured loss
with the "design of producing loss under his insurance
contract."62
Designing intent, however, is not a satisfactory description
of the type of intent that may justify a public policy limitation.
Assume, for example, that only the prospect of liability pre-
vents a specific employer from engaging in employment dis-
crimination. The employer insures against losses resulting
from employment discrimination, engages in employment dis-
58. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
59. Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 133 N.E. 432 (1921).
60. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943).
Messersmith and Jones also indicate that illegal intentional misconduct does
not require restrictions on insurance coverage. See also Zurich Gen. Accident
& Liab. Ins. Co. v. Flickinger, 33 F.2d 853, 855-56 (4th Cir. 1929) (negligence in
drinking illegal bootleg whiskey did not preclude insurance recovery for
death); Dent v. Virginia Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 226 A.2d 166, 168 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1967) (recovery permitted when death of insured resulted from insured's
criminal conduct).
61. See E. PAtrERSON, supra note 29, § 58, at 258-59 ("It is not enough [to
exempt the insurer from liability] that the insured intended to do the act that
was a cause of the insured event; it must further be shown that he did it with
the design of producing loss under his insurance contract."); Comment, supra
note 4, at 196 ('The test [of whether public policy should bar insurance cover-
age] is not simply whether the insured acted intentionally or unintentionally,
but rather whether he may have been stimulated by the prospect of
indemnification.").
62. E. PATrERSON, supra note 29, § 58, at 258.
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crimination, and is then found liable for losses resulting from
that action. The employer has not acted with the "design of
producing loss under his insurance contract;" the insurance
proceeds will go to the victims of the discrimination, not to the
employer. Rather, the employer had other motives, possibly to
satisfy a desire for discrimination 63 or to maintain a contented
workforce.6 4 Nevertheless, the employer's intentional miscon-
duct should preclude insurance coverage. The employer calcu-
lated that without insurance its purposes did not outweigh the
potential of liability; but with insurance the employer calcu-
lated that its discriminatory purposes did outweigh the poten-
tial costs of liability.65 Thus, the conflict between deterrence
and insurance is the sharpest when this type of "calculating"
intent66 is present. It is this type of intent that justifies a public
policy limitation on insurance coverage. 67
Often a legal finding of discriminatory intent in an employ-
ment discrimination case does not ensure the presence of the
calculating intent that would justify a public policy limitation
on insurance coverage. In cases relying on statistical evi-
dence,68 a court may make a legal finding of discriminatory in-
tent even though "the ultimate question to which the evidence
is addressed does not seem to be the employer's motivation."69
Rather, statistical evidence in a disparate treatment case7 0 will
63. Fiss, supra note 38, at 250, 253.
64. Id. at 258.
65. The employer, of course, hopes that its discriminatory activities would
escape detection, and hence there would be no liability under the policy. Even
with insurance the employer would suffer certain adverse consequences from
liability. For example, the employer's insurance premiums would probably in-
crease in price.
66. Calculating intent should encompass every instance of designing intent
and, in addition, certain other instances of intentional misconduct such as the
one described in the text. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
67. There may, of course, be reasons other than deterrence for restricting
insurance coverage of employment discrimination liability. Some, such as
avoiding employer profit from illegal employment discrimination, may be
closely intertwined with deterrence. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying
text. Others may be relatively independent of the deterrence rationale, for ex-
ample, expressing social condemnation of illegal employment discrimination.
See infra note 156.
68. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
69. T. EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 603 (1981). See also Cohn, On
the Use of Statistics in Employment Discrimination Cases, 55 IND. L.J. 493, 493
(1980) ("[Statistical e]vidence ... is deemed to represent the outcome of em-
ployers' discriminatory practices, including practices the description of which
does not indicate any overt discriminatory intent.").
70. This section discusses disparate treatment cases because a legal find-
ing of discriminatory intent is a legal requisite to liability. See supra note 12
and accompanying text. A legal finding of discriminatory intent is not a prereq-
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probably indicate a disparity between the composition of an
employer's work force and that of the general population from
which the employer draws its work force.71 For example, the
employer's work force may be 2 percent Mexican-American,
while the general population in the area is 25 percent Mexican-
American. Because the law of employment discrimination as-
sumes that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will result in a
work force representative of the racial and ethnic composition
of the general population,72 such statistics will shift the burden
to the employer to explain the disparity.73 If the employer fails
to present any evidence, the statistics may result in a legal find-
ing of discriminatory intent74 even though the statistics fall
short of convincingly demonstrating that the employer engaged
in intentional discrimination.7 5 Indeed, even if the statistics
uisite for finding disparate impact liability. See supra note 22 and accompany-
ing text.
71. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-
40 n.20 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08
(1977). See generally Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Dis-
crimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARv. L. REV. 387, 393
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Beyond the Prima Facie Case]; Note, Evidence:
Statistical Proof in Employment Discrimination Cases, 2Q OKLA. L. REV. 885,
887 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Evidence]; Note, Employment Discrimination:
Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII, 59 VA. L. REV. 463, 469 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as Statistics and Preferences].
72. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40
n.20 (1977).
73. See D. BALus & J, CoLE, supra note 21, § 1.22, at 27; FEDERAL STATU-
TORY LAw, supra note 9, § 1.8, at 80. Baldus and Cole claim that statistics have
been assigned a burden-shifting function. in discrimination law because of the
inherent limits of statistics as a means of proving intentional discrimination. D.
BALDus & J. CoLE, supra note 21, at 26-27.
74. Cf. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970)
(statistics indicating an extraordinarily small number of black employees es-
tablished a violation of Title VII).
75. Although a significant disparity gives rise to an inference that employ-
ees were not selected at random and, hence, that unlawful discrimination oc-
curred, see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40
n.20 (1977), that is not necessarily a valid inference. For example, the statistics
may be based on a small sample and, therefore, chance rather than unlawful
discrimination may have caused the disparity. See id. (citing Mayor of Phila-
delphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620-21 (1974)). Similarly,
the inference may not be valid if the general population figures are drawn from
an area that does not coincide with the area from which the employer draws its
work force or would draw its Work force in the absence of discrimination, see
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 310-12 (1977); Statistics
and Preferences, supra note 71, at 469, or if the general population figures do
not take into account special qualifications that are required to fill particular
jobs. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40
n.20 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13
(1977). See generally Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination
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were more sophisticated 76 and the existence of discrimination
were quite probable, statistics themselves cannot conclusively
indicate whether the discrimination was intentional or uninten-
tional,7 7 and they certainly cannot isolate the more obtuse cal-
culating intent that would justify the prohibition of insurance
coverage.7 8 Such sophisticated statistics are nevertheless suffi-
cient to support a legal finding of discriminatory intent and,
hence, to trigger Title VII liability.7 9
Calculating intent may also be absent when the insured
employer is found liable not for the employer's own conduct
but for "an employee's act which he has not encouraged or, in-
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1153-54
(1971).
76. This assumes that the statistics eliminate the obvious reasons for the
disparity, other than discrimination, and are based on a sample size sufficient
to account for the possibility of chance. See generally D. BALDus & J. COLE,
supra note 21; FEDERAL STATUTORY LAw, supra note 9, § 1.8(b), at 78.
77. See D. BALDuS & J. COLE, supra note 21, § 1.22, at 26 ("[E]ven under
ideal conditions statistics cannot conclusively prove intentional discrimina-
tion."); FEDERAL STATUTORY LAw, supra note 9, § 1.8(b), at 80 ("[A] rejection of
[the null] hypothesis [that the employer did not discriminate] does not mean
that the employer is conclusively found to have discriminated."). Cf. Statistics
and Preferences, supra note 71, at 479 (statistics may indicate discrimination
even though the employer's policies are inadvertently rather than intentionally
discriminatory.).
78. Professor Tribe has discussed the inherent inability of statistics to
"prove" intent and, by necessary implication, designing intent, and the resul-
tant tendency to emphasize those "objectively verifiable" factors that statistics
can prove. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Pro-
cess, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1329 (1971). In the context of disparate treatment dis-
crimination, a "soft" variable--discriminatory intent-is formally dispositive.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, "hard" variables-sta-
tistical disparities between the racial and sexual composition of an employer's
work force and the general population-have become dispositive even though
they are not linked to the employer's conduct or state of mind. See Tribe,
supra, at 1361-66.
79. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
339-43 (1977); Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169, 177-79 (1st Cir. 1977),
remanded, 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
This exposition is not intended as a criticism of the use of statistical evi-
dence in employment discrimination cases. On the contrary, since direct evi-
dence of discriminatory intent is rarely available, see supra notes 59-67 and
accompanying text, statistical evidence must be available as a burden-shifting
mechanism if the employment discrimination laws are to have any effective-
ness. Indeed, the current anti-employment discrimination effort is probably
doomed to limited effectiveness even with the use of statistical evidence. See
D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW § 9.13 (1980); Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Anti-discrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Mmi-. L REV. 1049 (1978). Cf. L. Tmrusow, THE
ZERO-SUM SoCirTY 184-85 (1980) ("[E] qual opportunity programs have not suc-
ceeded in opening the economy to greater employment for blacks .... [T]here
is nothing that would lead anyone to predict improvements in the near
future.").
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deed, which he has warned his employees against commit-
ting."80 In that situation the employer through its agent has
acted with discriminatory intent,8 1 but the employer probably
has not acted with the type of calculating intent 82 that would
justify a public policy prohibition on insurance coverage. 83
That is, the employer did not intend to neglect its anti-discrimi-
nation duties and thereby undermine the deterrence goal of Ti-
tle VII, but rather intended to insure against liability resulting
from unauthorized and unexpected discrimination by
employees.
A legal finding of discriminatory intent can therefore be
found in a Title VII case even in the absence of any evidence
relating directly to the employer's motivation. It is, however,
the employer's motivation that may warrant a prohibition on
insurance coverage. 84 As a result, the inchoate doctrine's reli-
ance on intentional discrimination to justify public policy-based
restrictions on insurance coverage for employment discrimina-
tion liability is ill-advised. A public policy restriction is justi-
fied only by misconduct performed with calculating intent, and
employment discrimination litigation in most cases does not
address that issue.
C. COMPENSATION
Compensation for the victims of illegal employment dis-
80. New York Opinion, supra note 10, at 201.
81. See, e.g., Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424, 436 (D. Utah
1971) (" 'The modern corporate entity consists of the individuals who manage
it, and little, if any, progress in eradicating discrimination in employment will
be made if the corporate employer is able to hide behind the shield of individ-
ual employee action."'); EEOC Decision No. 71-1442, EEOC Decisions (CCH)
6216 (1971) (quoting EEOC Post-trial Memorandum of Law at 6) (employer
liable for employee's discriminatory acts even though employer disclaimed re-
sponsibility for personal bias and promised dismissal of employees who failed
to conform to the company's nondiscrimination policy).
82. In some circumstances, however, the employer may have acted with
calculating intent. Calculating intent may be present, for example, if the em-
ployer because of the protection afforded by insurance coverage relaxed its ac-
tive, anti-discrimination supervision of employees, and that relaxation resulted
in the discrimination creating the insured loss. See infra notes 147-48 and ac-
companying text. See also New York Opinion, supra note 10, at 201.
83. Public policy permits insurance coverage for an employer who is liable
for an assault by an employee. See, e.g., Floralbell Amusement Corp. v. Stan-
dard Sur. & Casualty Co., 170 Misc. 1003, 1008, 9 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963 (1937); Robin-
son v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 159 Miss. 14, 21, 131 So. 541, 543 (1931).
But see New York Opinion, supra note 10, at 201; Comment, Liability Insurance
and Assault and Battery: Coverage and Damages Problems, 50 CoRNxLL L.Q.
506, 509-10 (1965).
84. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
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crimination is one of the twin goals of Title VII remedies.8 5 The
inchoate doctrine prohibits insurance coverage for some dispa-
rate treatment discrimination and, as a result, may adversely
affect the compensation goal.86 Thus, the inchoate doctrine as-
sumes that the compensation benefits of insurance coverage
are occasionally outweighed by the adverse effect insurance
coverage may have on deterrence.
There are three primary compensation benefits of insur-
ance coverage for employment discrimination liability. The
most obvious benefit is that insurance coverage would assure
full compensation when an employer was insolvent or
otherwise financially unable to pay for the damages resulting
from its illegal discrimination. Similarly, insurance may permit
compensation when in the absence of insurance it would be de-
nied, because such compensation would have an adverse im-
pact on innocent third parties. 87
Insurance may also permit more adequate compensation to
persons other than the direct victims of discrimination. 88 As-
sume, for example, that a black employee has proven illegal
discrimination and is seeking retroactive seniority as a remedy.
The black employee is presumptively entitled to that relief8 9
even though it may undermine certain contractual rights and
expectations of white employees. 90 This "sharing of the bur-
den"9 1 of past discrimination is appropriate, even though the
sharing is forced upon arguably innocent 92 employees rather
85. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976); Albemarle Pa-
per Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). The other goal is deterrence. See
supra note 28.
86. The payment of a large award of back pay to a class and imposition
of attorney's fees in a discrimination case conceivably could cripple the
employer financially or even put the offending company out of busi-
ness. Conversely, insurance against liability for discriminatory prac-
tices in employment could benefit discriminatees. Where a class of
employees is entitled to back pay under a court order and the em-
ployer is financially unable to comply with the same, insurance would
provide the mandated compensation.
Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga.
1978) (footnote omitted). See Comment, supra note 4, at 200.
87. See, e.g., Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
721-23 (1978); Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 476 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (E.D. Mich.
1979). See Comment, supra note 4, at 200.
88. Situations in which compensation would not be made but for the pres-
ence of insurance coverage are presumably quite rare. See Union Camp Corp.
v. Continental Casualty Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 568 n.2 (S.D. Ga. 1978).
89. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 779 n.41 (1976).
90. Id. at 776-79.
91. Id. at 777.
92. The Franks majority believed that the white employees were merely
"arguably innocent," id. at 774, presumably because they received unjust bene-
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than upon the employer perpetrating the discrimination. 93 If
insurance were available to soften the impact on employers,94
courts may be more willing to compensate these arguably inno-
cent, white employees. Providing compensation would remedy
the lost contractual expectations of white employees and may
reduce friction between black victims and white employees
who become co-workers in such circumstances.
Insurance coverage for employment discrimination liability
would also provide employers with a cost spreading device.
Without insurance, individual employers would initially bear
the cost of employment discrimination liability.9 5 Those em-
ployers would then distribute that cost among stockholders,
customers, and employees. 9 6 The actual distribution would de-
pend upon a complex of factors such as the market strength of
the company and the strength of the employees' labor organiza-
tion. If insurance were available, several employers would bear
the initial cost, and it would then be spread among a much
larger number of stockholders, customers, and employees.9 7
fits from their employer's discriminatory practices. Other Justices, however,
believed that the employees were "perfectly innocent." Id. at 788 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
93. Id. at 787-89. See also Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Har-
vester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1320 (7th Cir. 1974) (retroactive seniority "would be
tantamount to shackling white employees with a burden of a past discrimina-
tion created not by them but by their employer").
94. Courts have not relied upon the impact on employers to justify their
failure to compensate these arguably innocent white employees. The issue has
simply not been presented, because the white employees frame the issue as a
conflict between them and the black victims rather than as a conflict between
them and their employers. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 777 n.38
(1976). Employers should be required to compensate these white employees
for their losses regardless of the availability or unavailability of insurance cov-
erage. See Neuborne, supra note 5, at 558-59. Insurance coverage, however,
may be beneficial as a catalyst for white employees to direct their legal attacks
against their employers and as a method for relaxing judicial resistance to such
compensation.
95. Employers may occasionally be successful in sharing this initial bur-
den. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
96. See, e.g., Slain, Risk Distribution and Treble Damages: Insurance and
Contribution, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 263, 270 (1970); Comment, supra note 4, at 201 &
n.55.
97. This assumes that the insurance contract pools the combined risks of a
number of employers. See R. KEETON, supra note 29, at 6-7 ("[Insurance] ap-
proaches the objective of reducing uncertainty by treating as a unit the com-
bined risk of multiple ventures of a given type.") (footnote omitted). Instead of
risk pooling, the employer may decide that its risk of loss is less than that of
the rest of the industry and instead opt for the retrospective form of experience
rating. Under this form the insurance company adjusts the premium after the
policy expires in accordance with the actual losses incurred under the policy.
Cahill, Ratemaking in Liability Insurance and Related Lines, in PROPERTY AND
LIBILTY INSURANCE HANDnOOK 697-98 (J. Long & D. Gregg eds. 1965). As a re-
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Spreading the costs in this manner is beneficial. The war
against illegal employment discrimination is not a series of un-
connected battles against individual employers. 98 Rather, it is
a war to reverse the racism and sexism that pervades our soci-
ety.99 Consequently, because "our heritage of discrimination is,
in the largest sense, the responsibility of the nation as a whole,
the widest possible degree of cost spreading is appropriate.'oo
D. PumUc PoLIcY AND DETERRENCE
The inchoate doctrine assumes that public policy must be
used to control abuses that would result from a less restrained
operation of the insurance market. The only abuse that is men-
tioned, however, is that insurance for employment discrimina-
tion liability may "promote violations of the law."' 0 ' Because
the inchoate doctrine is designed to prevent insurance from un-
dermining the deterrent effect of Title VII liability,102 it should
deny insurance coverage to those employers that would violate
Title VII with insurance but would not violate the law absent
such coverage. There are two other possible relationships be-
tween insurance and deterrence. Insurance may have a deter-
rence-enhancing effect, that is, insured employers may be less
likely to violate Title VII than uninsured employers. Or insur-
ance may be deterrence-neutral because employers would or
would not violate Title VII regardless of the presence or ab-
sence of insurance. The effect of insurance on Title VII's deter-
rence goal03 and the role of public policy in achieving that goal
need to be examined.
Insurance may be deterrence-enhancing because insurers
have significant incentives to engage in loss prevention activi-
sult, the employer distributes its costs over time rather than among a pool of
employers. Thus, experience rating insurance would have less of a cost-spread-
ing effect than risk-pooling insurance.
98. See Freeman, supra note 79, at 1052-57.
99. See Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U.
Cm. L. REV. 213, 216-19 (1980).
100. Neuborne, supra note 5, at 558 n.41. But see Comment, Cost Allocation
in Title VII Remedies: Who Pays for Past Employment Discrimination?, 44
TENN. L. REV. 347, 376 (1977) (cost-spreading would disproportionately burden
those with lower incomes).
101. Comment, supra note 4, at 203. Cf. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc. v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 23 FEP Cases 778, 782 n.14 (D.D.C. 1980) (insurance
policy covering intentional discrimination would likely violate public policy and
thus be unenforceable); Union Camp Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 452 F.
Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (deterrence exists because coverage excluded for
intentional or consensual acts of discrimination by insured).
102. See Comment, supra note 4, at 199-200.
103. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
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ties.10 4 With respect to insurance for employment discrimina-
tion liability, these activities translate into anti-discrimination
counseling and advice which should promote compliance with,
rather than violations of, the law. 05 In addition, if insurance
coverage for employment discrimination liability becomes com-
monplace, insurance companies would deny coverage or charge
higher than normal premiums106 to employers with questiona-
ble employment practices, putting these employers at a com-
petitive disadvantage. 07  Whether the immediacy of this
competitive disadvantage would have an equal or greater deter-
rent effect than the more speculative prospect of an uninsured
liability for employment discrimination is debatable. Neverthe-
less, the competitive disadvantage would undoubtedly have
some deterrent effect.
Despite these potential deterrence-enhancing effects, insur-
ance may also have adverse effects on Title VII's deterrence
goal. Some' employers may be motivated to engage in illegal
employment discrimination because insurance would cover any
resultant liability.lo 8 For example, insurance for employment
104. In some types of insurance, premiums are charged in advance and
are based upon the loss experience of the immediate past. In these
cases, any action that prevents or reduces losses benefits insurers be-
cause of the lag between the time premiums are calculated and losses
are paid. In other words, benefits result because premiums are
charged for expected losses that may actually be reduced through
prevention.
H. DENENBERG, R. EILERS, G. HOFFMAN, C. KLINE, J. MELoNE & H. SNmER, RISK
AND INSURANCE 102 (1964) [hereinafter cited as H. DENENBERG].
In addition, insurers have competition-based incentives to engage in loss
prevention activities:
[I]f one insurer renders this type of service, insureds of other compa-
nies will feel that it is something they should have. Furthermore, if the
insurer does not encourage the prevention of losses it may not be able
to reduce its premium charges and thus may be at a competitive
disadvantage.
Id. See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 13.5 (1956); W.
YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE 379 (1971); McCracken, Loss Pre-
vention in Liability Insurance and Related Lines, in PROPERTY AND LIABILITY
INSURANCE HANDBOOK 667-69 (J. Long & D. Gregg eds. 1965).
105. See Comment, supra note 4, at 199.
106. See Insurer Screens Out Risks, Bus. INS., Dec. 22, 1980, at 28 (on the ba-
sis of an extensive risk assessment, an underwriter of pollution insurance may
deny coverage or adjust the premium).
107. A higher than normal premium is an obvious competitive disadvantage.
Other disadvantages may be less obvious. For example, an employer without
liability insurance cbvering this type of loss may have to pay more to borrow
money arid may be less willing to commit available resources to capital im-
provement than an insured employer. See H. DENENBERG, supra note 104, at
150-51.
108. This employer is acting with calculating intent, see supra notes 63-67
and accompanying text.
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discrimination liability may result in discrimination to satisfy
an employer's personal preferencese9 or to obtain economic
benefits"O frustrated by the threat of liability."'
Although a public policy restriction may be necessary in
such situations,"12 it is seldom used. The key to the restriction,
the employer's motivation, is generally open to an innocent in-
terpretation."13 Moreover, the insurer bears the burden of
proving that the employer's motivation was to collect insurance
and, given the difficulty in proving motive"14 and the apparent
prejudice against insurance companies,"S that would not be an
easy task."16 It could thus be argued that the public policy re-
striction should be expanded to include situations in which an
employer's calculating intent"17 cannot be proven but neverthe-
less may be present. The inchoate doctrine sanctions such an
expansion of the public policy restriction by prohibiting insur-
ance coverage for all disparate treatment discrimination.": 8
The expansionist approach of the inchoate doctrine should
be rejected for several reasons. First, the crude expansion pro-
posed by the inchoate doctrine is both over- and under-inclu-
109. Personal preferences may include "antipathy, a desire to preserve a
certain type of social structure, or a desire to associate only with whites." Fiss,
supra note 38, at 253.
110. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
111. The disparate treatment/disparate impact distinction is not useful in
determining whether the presence of insurance motivated the employer to en-
gage in illegal discrimination. Such discrimination can take either form. The
employer could simply treat blacks, for example, less favorably than whites
and, hence, engage in prototypical disparate treatment discrimination. See In-
ternational Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Or
the employer could accomplish the same result by purposefully employing a
criterion that screens out most blacks and thereby engage in disparate impact
discrimination. Id.
112. See supra notes 59-67; infra notes 139-56 and accompanying text.
113. See E. PATrERSON, supra note 29, § 58, at 258-59. The employer merely
has to show that the presence of insurance was not a motivating factor in the
discrimination. The employer could argue, for example, that the discrimina-
tion, although present statistically, was wholly inadvertent, see supra note 78
and accompanying text, or that the insurance created no economic incentive to
discriminate. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th Cir. 1972)
(en banc) (per curiam) ("[I]ntent, motive and purpose are elusive subjective
concepts."). See also Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977). See generally Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Mo-
tive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95.
115. See, e.g., E. PATrERSON, supra note 29, at 259. See generally McCoR-
MICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 479-83 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
116. See E. PATrERSON, supra note 29, at 259.
117. See supra notes 66-67.
118. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
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sive. It is over-inclusive because it will prohibit insurance
coverage for disparate treatment discrimination even in the ab-
sence of calculating intent." 9 It is under-inclusive because it
permits insurance coverage for disparate impact discrimination
even though calculating intent may be present.120 To the ex-
tent it prohibits insurance coverage even though the insurance
was not a motivating factor in the discrimination, it sacrifices
the compensation and deterrence-enhancing benefits of insur-
ance without providing any deterrence in return. To the extent
the doctrine permits insurance coverage even though the insur-
ance was a motivating factor in the discrimination, it totally
fails to fulfill its deterrence-preserving mission.
Second, the expansionist approach of the inchoate doctrine
is unnecessary; the private insurance market will preserve the
deterrent effect of Title VII as well as the inchoate doctrine
without emasculating the compensation and deterrence-en-
hancing benefits of insurance coverage. The inchoate doctrine
is intended to protect the public's interest in deterring Title VII
violations, and the insurer's interest precisely correlates with
this public interest. The rational insurer will attempt to avoid
providing coverage121 to employers that view insurance as a li-
cense to discriminate. Such employers present moral
hazards,122 making it extremely difficult to assess risks and to
assign premiums.123 In addition, insurers providing coverage to
these employers may be unable to compete with insurers hav-
ing a better risk pool.124 The private insurance market will thus
attempt to identify such employers and.to deny them insurance
coverage. 25 Moreover, while identifying this type of employer
is difficult, insurers may protect themselves by drafting policies
119. See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
121. Alternatively, the insurer may provide coverage only at greatly in-
creased prices. But see E. PATTERSON, supra note 29, at 226 ("Insurance is prac-
tically useful only where the probability of the occurrence of the loss is a minor
fraction, rarely more than one-tenth.") (footnote omitted).
122. A "moral hazard" is generally defined as any nonphysical condition of
the insured that increases the frequency or severity of insured losses. See H.
DENENBERG, supra note 104, at 8; Adam, Underwriting in Fire Insurance, in
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE HANDBOOK 194 (J. Long & D. Gregg eds.
1965).
123. See Adam, supra note 122, at 194-95; Ginsburgh, Underwriting in Liabil-
ity Insurance and Related Lines, in PROPERTY AND IaABIrrY INSURANCE HAND-
BOOK 702-03 (J. Long & D. Gregg eds. 1965).
124. See supra note 104.
125. It is probably self-evident that because "such insurance is legal does
not mean that it will be sold to everyone." Farbstein & Stillman, Insurance for
the Commission of Intentional Torts, 20 HASTINGS LJ. 1219, 1253 (1969).
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designed to discourage the insured event. For example, the
policies may use a coinsurance provision to expose the in-
sured's finances, along with the insurer's finances, to liability
for the loss. 126 Thus, the insurance market can retain the de-
terrence aspects of Title VII liability,127 while furthering the
compensation and deterrence-enhancing aspects of insur-
ance 128 through coverage for the bulk of liability. The inchoate
doctrine, however, totally sacrifices the flexibility of insurance
in pursuit of deterrence. 2 9
Third, the expansion proposed by the inchoate doctrine is
an anachronism. Marine insurance, life insurance, and fire in-
surance have all been criticized as "generator[s] of evil."' 30 Li-
ability insurance for risks other than employment
discrimination liability has been attacked because "the protec-
126. [Such c]oinsurance provisions usually take the form of a deducti-
ble policy, in which the insured must pay the initial cost of the liability
up to a stated amount, beyond which the insurer is liable up to the lim-
its of its policy. Another common form is the participating policy, in
which the insured participates in the cost of the loss along with the in-
surer at a percentage stated in the policy.
Id.
127. Occasionally, the interests of a private insurer may not coincide with
the public's interest in deterrence. For example, a private insurer may decide
in a particular case that it is more important to placate an important client than
it is to resist a claim that is not in the public interest. To meet this potential
problem, it may be advisable to authorize the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and/or state insurance departments to review and, if necessary, to
challenge insurer decisions to pay employer claims. See Comment, supra note
4, at 202 n.62. The purpose of the review, however, would not be to insure com-
pliance with the inchoate doctrine, but rather to insure compliance with the
narrower public policy restriction proposed below. See infra note 157.
128. See supra notes 87-107 and accompanying text. This assumes, of
course, that private insurers will not simply incorporate the distinctions of the
inchoate doctrine into their insurance contracts. If they did so, there would be
no compensation and deterrence-enhancing benefits from erasing the inchoate
doctrine's distinctions from public policy, because the same distinctions would
survive as private policy. It is virtually certain, however, that private insurers
will incorporate more sophisticated and less restrictive distinctions into their
contracts. Private insurers have not hesitated to insure other types of risks
when public policy restrictions were eased, see infra notes 130-37 and accompa-
nying text, and for good reason-more risks to insure means an expansion of
the insurance business.
129. The deterrence argument supporting the inchoate doctrine "becomes
highly specious when applied to coverage requiring the insured to pay a sub-
stantial deductible or percentage of participation." Farbstein & Stillman, supra
note 125, at 1253.
130. Comment, supra note 7, at 26. See also State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v.
Merchant's Exch. Mut. Benevolent Soc'y, 72 Mo. 146, 158 (1880); Statute of
George H, 1746, 19 Geo. 2, ch. 37; Statute of George III, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, ch. 48
(statute limiting life insurance, because it led to "a mischievous Kind of Gam-
ing"); Note, supra note 7, at 329-50 (advocates limits on insurance for damages
arising from violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983); supra note 7.
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tion afforded the insured by the policy removes the financial
deterrent against negligent and criminal acts."' 31 These early,
broad challenges to insurance have all been rejected. Insur-
ance may now survive public policy challenges when the in-
sured conduct was illegal' 32 or when the conduct creating the
loss was intentional.133 Insurance is permissible even when
the consequences of insurance's possible anti-deterrent effects
are severe.1 34 Indeed, the federal government has recently re-
quired pollution insurance in some situations 35 even though
the insured conduct may be illegal and extremely damaging.
The broad challenges have been replaced by narrower, more
sophisticated public policy restrictions.136 The inchoate doc-
trine deserves and will probably suffer a similar fate.137
The inchoate doctrine's assumption that public policy must
131. Comment, supra note 7,, at 26. The tenor of the attacks on insurance is
evident in this quotation:
[I]n those countries where it is best known and most widely practised,
insurance has led to whole cycles and systems of crime and evil....
II]n all its great branches, it is prone to evil .... [Niot only [does it
offer] bribes for the commission of sins against the law, but ... , in
thousands upon thousands of cases, those bribes have been taken and
the crimes paid for have been duly committed.... Though to the
mind of the man whose attention is occupied with his own affairs, there
may appear to be no relation between the building of unseaworthy
ships, the mismanagement of a friendly society, the burning of a town,
and the starving of a baby,... all these and countless other crimes
and social evils are due to one central cause-they are the fruit of di-
verse graftings upon one stem [of the tree of insurance].
A. CAMPBELT, INSURANCE AND CRimE 378-79 (1902).
132. See, e.g., New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191, 193-94
(6th Cir. 1943); Todd v. Traders & Mechanics Ins. Co., 230 Mass. 595, 598-99, 120
N.E. 142, 144 (1918); Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 164, 133
N.E. 432, 433 (1921); Brower v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Co., 318 Pa. 440, 442,
177 A. 826, 827 (1935); Sky v. Keystone Mut. Casualty Co., 150 Pa. Super. 613,
616-17, 29 A.2d 230, 231-32 (1942). See also supra note 60.
133. See, e.g., New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones, 135 F.2d 191, 193-94
(6th Cir. 1943); Bennett Motor Co. v. Lyon, 14 Utah 2d 161, 164, 380 P.2d 69, 71
(1963).
134. The consequences of any anti-deterrent effects from automobile and
fire insurance are severe. Automobile accidents claim thousands of lives each
year, and arson is a national problem. Despite these severe consequences
there is no broad public policy ban on these types of insurance. Rather, the re-
strictions are much narrower. See infra note 137.
135. 46 Fed. Reg. 2859-2860 (1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 264.147). See
Hertzberg & Jasen, Insurers Fret Over Covering Pollution Costs, Wall St. J., July
17, 1981, at 29, col. 3.
136. Broad approaches banning life insurance or fire insurance, for exam-
ple, have been rejected for narrower public policy restrictions such as the re-
quirement that the insured have an insurable interest in the insured event, R.
KEETON, supra note 29, §§ 3.2-3.5; E. PATTERSON, supra note 29, § 22, and that
the insured not act with calculating intent. See supra notes 63-67 and accompa-
nying text.
137. See infra notes 139-56 and accompanying text.
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be used to control abuses that would result from a less re-
strained operation of the insurance market may have some va-
lidity. A public policy restriction may be necessary to preclude
insurance coverage when an employer acts with calculating in-
tent. The interest in preserving the deterrent effect of Title VII
liability, however, does not have the "overpowering weight"' 3 8
required to justify the much broader restrictions proposed by
the inchoate doctrine.
IV. INSURANCE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
The inchoate doctrine does not directly address the conflict
between insurance and deterrence. Rather than expanding the
public policy restriction,139 the restriction should be limited to
those situations in which insurance may conflict with deter-
rence. The public policy restriction should thus preclude insur-
ance coverage when the employer-insured has acted with
calculating intent.140 But what does it mean in employment
discrimination cases to state that an employer has acted with
calculating intent? What type of evidentiary showing is re-
138. See R. KEETON, supra note 29, at 102. Professor Keeton argues that the
interests supporting public policy restrictions on insurance must have "over-
powering weight," because such restrictions necessarily impair contractual
freedom. Id. at 101-02. Professor Keeton's argument lends support to this Arti-
cle's conclusion that the deterrence policy underlying the inchoate doctrine
does not have the overpowering weight necessary to justify the doctrine's im-
pairment of contractual freedom. This Article does not adopt Professor Kee-
ton's argument because the state can and should impair contractual freedom
by, for example, banning "yellow dog" contracts, see, e.g., Norris-La Guardia
Act, § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1976), prohibiting contracts "in restraint of trade or
commerce," Sherman Antitrust Act; §§ 1, 3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1976), and revising
insurance contracts and other contracts of adhesion to conform with the rea-
sonable expectations of the consumer. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal.
2d 263, 269-71, 419 P.2d 168, 171-72, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107-08 (1966); Corgatelli v.
Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 616, 619-20, 533 P.2d 737, 740-41 (1975); C
& J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 159, 176-77 (Iowa 1975). Al-
though the interest in contractual freedom would provide additional support for
this Article, it is not necessary to make the argument. The inchoate doctrine's
overly broad restrictions cannot override the compensation and deterrence-en-
hancing benefits of insurance, and so it is unnecessary to consider the virtues
or vices of the doctrine's interference with contractual freedom.
139. See supra notes 118-37 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. The notion that the pub-
lic policy restriction should only be as broad as the deterrence goal which it is
designed to protect is not a new one. Rather, it is precisely this notion which
establishes the scope of the public policy restriction for insurance coverage of
risks other than employment discrimination liability. See E. PAT=ERSON, supra
note 29, at 257-59; supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text. Thus, the inchoate
doctrine is the new and relatively untested public policy restriction, while the
public policy restriction proposed in this Article has been time-tested.
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quired to prove such intent and thereby to preclude insurance
coverage?
Statements or admissions by the employer would clearly
provide the most persuasive and direct evidence of calculating
intent. If, for example, an employer was told that certain em-
ployment practices might violate Title VII and the employer re-
sponded, "It doesn't matter, I'm insured,"' 4' that evidence
would be relevant and persuasive on the issue of the em-
ployer's intent. More specifically, the evidence would indicate
that the employer was unconcerned about the possible Title
VII violation because the insurance carrier would bear any re-
sultant liability. Such a statement may be evidence of calculat-
ing intent and, hence, may preclude insurance coverage for
Title VII liability.142
An inference of calculating intent may also be appropriate
when the employer would obtain economic benefits through in-
surance coverage. An employer employing men and women to
do equal or comparable work, for example, may decide that wo-
men would be willing to work for a lower wage rate than
men.14 3 In the absence of insurance, the employer may hesi-
tate to lower the wage rate for women employees, because such
action would violate the law, 4 4 and the employer, if prose-
cuted, would be liable to each woman employee for the differ-
ence in pay and possibly for an equal amount in liquidated
damages. 45 With insurance the employer may be more likely
to lower the wage rate for women employees; by doing so, the
employer would reap an immediate economic benefit by paying
141. Cf. Herschenson v. Weisman, 80 N.H. 557, 558, 119 A. 705, 705 (1923)
(Shortlybefore an accident the driver was cautioned about his careless driving;
the driver responded, "Don't worry, I carry insurance for that.").
142. Resolution of the intent issue would come after and would be largely
irrelevant to the issue of whether the employment practice violated Title VII
The employment practice may violate Title VII even in the absence of calculat-
ing intent and, indeed, even in the absence of any adverse employer intent.
See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1977); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36, n.15 (1977); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Unlike the inchoate doctrine, the proposed
public policy restriction prohibiting insurance if calculating intent is present
does not depend upon the disparate treatment/disparate impact distinction. In
the text's hypothetical, insurance coverage would be disallowed regardless of
the reason the employment practices violated Title VII.
143. See Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1977).
144. Differential wage rates for men and women because women will "ac-
cept" less would violate the Equal Pay Act of 1963, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976),
see Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1974); Bren-
nan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 241 n.12 (5th Cir. 1973), and may violate
Title VII, see Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168-69 (1981).
145. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), (c) (1976).
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women less, and if the employer is later found liable for the
wage disparity, the insurance would pay the damages.146 The
calculating intent standard is designed to discourage this type
of employer calculation. Consequently, when an employer
would obtain economic benefits through insurance coverage, a
rebuttable inference of calculating intent is appropriate. An
inference of calculating intent may also be appropriate when
the evidence is more subtle. An employer may, for example,
discontinue certain anti-discrimination efforts 147 when it ob-
tains insurance coverage.148 Such employer action timed to co-
incide with the effective date of insurance coverage would be
evidence of calculating intent and may preclude insurance
coverage.
There are, therefore, a number of ways to prove calculating
intent. The calculating intent standard, however, is narrower
than the inchoate doctrine, precluding insurance only when
there is evidence of a conflict between insurance and deter-
rence.14 9 Thus, the calculating intent standard is under-inclu-
sive-some employers will be able to hide their calculating
intent and as a result obtain insurance coverage even though
insurance motivated their illegal discriminatory activities.150
This under-inclusiveness, though unfortunate, is acceptable for
two reasons. First, the interests of insurance companies corre-
late with the interests supporting the public policy restric-
tion.15 ' Most insurance contracts will consequently contain
146. Except for equal pay claims, the employer will seldom gain a signifi-
cant economic benefit from insurance. See generally Fiss, supra note 38, at 257-
58. In the ordinary hiring discrimination case, for example, the employer de-
cides to hire white employee A instead of black employee B. B then files suit,
claiming the decision was made on the basis of race. If the employer loses the
case, it would not reap an economic benefit from insurance as it would in an
equal pay case. In the equal pay case the employer was able to lower its essen-
tial labor costs by insuring against discrimination liability. In the hiring case
the employer merely avoided paying double the essential labor cost.
147. The employer may discontinue anti-discrimination workshops for its
supervisors or repeal an internal grievance procedure designed to handle sex-
ual harassment complaints. See generally E. PATTERSON, supra note 29, at 258-
59.
148. See New York Opinion, supra note 10, at 201.
149. The calculating intent standard precludes insurance only when there is
some evidence that the employer violated Title VII at least in part, because of
the insurance coverage. See supra notes 118-37 and accompanying text.
150. Indeed, one commentator has argued that insurance coverage may be
permitted even when there is evidence of calculating intent, because juries
"are likely to give an innocent interpretation to the insured's conduct, either
through prejudice against insurance companies or through unfamiliarity with
the way in which insurance frauds are carried out." E. PATrERSON, supra note
29, at 259.
151. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
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warranties designed to further the same deterrence goals as
the calculating intent standard.152 The warranties in private in-
surance contracts will thus supplement the public policy re-
striction. The under-inclusiveness of the calculating intent
standard then is less troublesome, because the standard is a
second screening device that need only be used after the pri-
mary screening device, warranties in private insurance con-
tracts, has been bypassed.153 In addition, the under-
inclusiveness of the calculating intent standard is acceptable
because of the compensation and deterrence-enhancing bene-
fits of insurance coverage. 5 4
Although a standard that is neither under- nor over-inclu-
sive would be ideal, such a standard is unattainable. A stan-
dard which is under-inclusive is the next best alternative.
Even though an occasional discriminatory act with calculating
intent may escape detection, the benefits of insurance coverage
will be widely available. A standard that is over-inclusive, how-
ever, provides no direct deterrence benefits155 and, in addition,
completely sacrifices the compensation and deterrence-enhanc-
ing benefit of insurance. The calculating intent standard is
preferable to the inchoate doctrine because it more directly ad-
dresses the conflict between deterrence and insurance, it is
workable, and it furthers the compensation and deterrence-en-
hancing benefits of insurance.15 6
V. CONCLUSION
The inchoate doctrine must be rejected.'5 7 It merely em-
152. See E. PATrESON, supra note 29, at 259.
153. But see supra note 127.
154. See supra notes 85-107 and accompanying text.
155. An overinclusive standard will by definition deny insurance to some
employers who have not been encouraged to discriminate by the presence of
insurance coverage.
156. Public policy may preclude insurance coverage as a way of expressing
moral indignation. Consequently, although the cases do not discuss it, insur-
ance coverage for employment discrimination liability may be limited in part to
express social disapproval of illegal employment discrimination. If this is the
reason behind the public policy restriction, the inchoate doctrine, because it
more broadly limits insurance coverage, would better achieve this goal than the
calculating intent standard. The simplest and most direct way of achieving the
goal, however, would be to provide for punitive damages and to impose restric-
tions on insurance coverage of the punitive damages. See Note, supra note 7, at
347-49.
157. This rejection could take many forms. Although Congress has en-
trusted primary control over insurance practices to the states, McCarran-Fergu-
son Act §§ 1-5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976); see also the legislative history of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 91 CONG. REc. 478-88, 1442-44 (1945) (Senate de-
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bodies the first wave of protest that invariably greets the exten-
sion of insurance principles into a new area. The new doctrine
should recognize that insurance for liability resulting from em-
ployment discrimination is not unlike, and should not be
treated much differently than, liability insurance for other
types of hazards. Such insurance should not be overly re-
stricted; in that way its compensation and deterrence-enhanc-
ing benefits can be realized. Certain minimal restrictions are
nevertheless appropriate; public policy can and should prohibit
insurance for discrimination committed with calculating intent.
bate); id. at 1085-94 (House debate); id. at 483 (remarks of Sen. Radcliffe)
(states have right to "function freely in handling insurance"); id. at 485 (re-
marks of Sen. Revercomb) (Congress wants insurance "left in the control of
the States"); id at 1090 (remarks of Rep. Gwynne) ("we are as far as possible
removing ourselves from the [insurance] field"), Congress can supersede state
insurance regulations by a law that "specifically relates to the business of in-
surance." McCarran-Ferguson Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976). Congress could
consequently overturn the inchoate doctrine by passing a law that specifically
permits insurance for liability resulting from illegal employment discrimination
except when calculating intent was present. If Congress fails to act, however,
the states control the issue. States which have adopted the inchoate doctrine
by interpreting state statutes, see 1945 Op. Ohio Att'y Gen. 295, may require leg-
islative action to change their public policy. The majority of jurisdictions,
though, have either not adopted or not considered the inchoate doctrine or
have not based their adoption of the inchoate doctrine on an interpretation of a
state statute. These jurisdictions should be able to consider or to reconsider
the issue without the aid of legislation. See Farbstein & Stillman, supra note
125, at 1253-54.
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